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Cet article porte sur la relation entre la tendance vers la convergence en
Europe à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle et l'indicateur de bien-être choisi. On
construit un indice de bien-être des travailleurs qui comprend les séries de salaires
de Williamson et deux nouvelles séries sur les heures de travail et les
réglementations dans le marché du travail. Par rapport au PIB par habitant, le
nouvel indice de bien-être indique une faible tendance vers la convergence. Partout
en Europe, le bien-être des travailleurs était varié. Il est évident que la croissance
économique était liée à l'augmentation des échanges internationaux, alors que le
bien-être des travailleurs dépendait plus du taux de syndicalisation ou des politiques
d'un gouvernement central puissant.
This paper asks whether the trend toward convergence in late nineteenth
century Europe depends on the welfare measure used. We construct a Worker
Development Index (WDI) composed of Williamson’s real wage estimates, and new
series of work hours and labor market regulations. Compared to GDP/person, the
WDI shows a weaker tendency to converge. Across Europe, workers’ experiences in
the so-called "glory days" varied. Although increased trade led to higher levels of
output, workers’ welfare depended to a greater extent on union representation or a
strong central authority.
Mots Clés : Mondialisation, convergence, heures de travail, bien-être des
travailleurs
Keywords : Globalization, convergence, work hours, worker welfare
1Introduction
The claim that globalization in the late nineteenth century, the precursor of the
contemporary global world, led to widespread improvements in economic and
social well-being has become something of a stylized fact. Forbes magazine
observed unabashedly that 1860 to 1913 "were the glory days of the global
hand.  Goods, labor and capital flow[ed] freely between nations, and the
standard of living r[ose] across much of the world."1  The specialist literature
makes the stronger claim that increased trade and the movement of capital,
labor and technology led to the convergence of productivity (GDP/person and
GDP/hour worked) across developing and developed economies.2  Recently,
Williamson and his collaborators have extended this analysis in their studies
of the effect of trade and other factors, such as migration, on real wage
convergence.3  They have begun as well to explore the impact of globalization
on trends in income equality.  Not withstanding their results, in opting for real
wages as a measure of welfare this line of research raises some fundamental
questions with both weak and strong claims concerning trends and
convergence in productivity and standards of living before WWI:  What
measure best captures the impact of the global hand on social and economic
welfare?  Is the tendency toward convergence conditional on the choice of
welfare measure?  And what is the impact of trade on alternate measures of
welfare?  This paper attempts to address these points.
Most studies of income convergence for the period before 1913 rely heavily
on Angus Maddison’s estimates of GDP/person and GDP/hour worked.4
There are two reasons to be suspicious of these estimates.  First, there are a
number of weaknesses in Maddison’s work hour figures.  Second, it is widely
recognized that GDP/person is an imperfect indicator of welfare in periods of
institutional flux, such as the late nineteenth century which saw important
changes in workers’ entitlements and legislated work conditions.  For these
reasons, economic historians have turned to other measures.  Williamson, in
attempting to control for varying work hours, has constructed annual series of
real wages for a standard unit of time.  Crafts has exploited the United Nations
Human Development Index (HDI) to measure changes in welfare over time.5
                                                
1
 April 21, 1997.
2
 Among others, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, Economic Growth.
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2HDI is a composite index constructed from measures of longevity of life,
education and income.  In making the case for using HDI, Crafts wrote: "It is
the lives that people lead that are taken to be of intrinsic importance rather
than the incomes that they enjoy."6
This paper follows Crafts’ approach and constructs a composite index of
worker welfare, the Worker Development Index (WDI), for a selected group
of European countries.  The index combines Williamson’s real wage series
and two new data series, one on the changing pattern of work hours between
1870 and 1900, and the other on the rate of introduction of labor market
regulations and social insurance between 1830 and 1913.  We examine the
relationship between WDI, GDP/person, real wages and HDI to shed light on
the impact of changes in broad macroeconomic variables, including the degree
of openness and political and social changes, on welfare.  We find that
workers, firms and governments made trade-offs among wages, working hours
and conditions, and entitlements to unemployment and health insurance.
Although increased trade made have led to converging trends in factor prices,
there were countervailing changes in other work arrangements.  As a result,
workers of all nations did not share equally in the so-called glory days of the
international economy.  We also find that while lowering tariffs had a positive
impact on GDP, it was less important in determining worker welfare. 
This paper is organized in four sections.  In the first section, we bring to light
some problems with Maddison's hour worked series.  Section 2 develops new
estimates of hours worked in Europe between 1870 and 1900.  Unlike
Maddison's estimates, our series show that work hours were not uniform
across countries and sectors.  We use this new data to construct leisure
adjusted estimates of worker welfare.  Section 3 extends the analysis to the
conditions of work and the treatment workers could expect if they fell injured,
sick or had to retire.  Following Crafts, Section 4 combines the evidence on
work hours and labor market regulation, along with real wages, in a WDI.  We
then evaluate the link between trade and WDI.
Maddison’s estimates of GDP and work hours
Maddison's estimates of real GDP and hours worked are generally taken as the
starting point in the study of international levels of incomes.  Although
Maddison and others have revised his original figures for GDP, the work-hour
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3estimates have received less attention.  For the period before 1913 Maddison
wrote:
Because of the uncertainty surrounding these [hours of work] rather
arbitrary figures, we have assumed that the movement [our emphasis]
in working hours from 1870 to 1913 was the same in all our countries
[Western Europe and North America].  This is probably a reasonable
assumption.7
Further, because Maddison had better estimates for the UK than other
countries, he assumed that all countries had the same work hours per week as
Britain until 1913 (even Canada and the US).8
There are good grounds to be suspicious of Maddison’s underlying
assumptions.  The actual work hours for Britain used by Maddison are not
consistent with the estimates of 56 work hours per week in 1873 and 46.6
hours in 1913 reported by R.C.O. Matthews and his collaborators.9  Nor can it
be assumed that the pattern of hour changes was identical across countries,
even those going through similar stages of industrialization.  While the decline
of work hours in the UK had a lot to do with rising income levels, trade unions
and social reformers affected significantly the timing of the decline.
Consequently, it is difficult to extrapolate from the UK case as Maddison has
done.   
How did Maddison’s assumptions about work hours affect his findings of
overall convergence of GDP/hour worked? Williamson, recognizing the
weaknesses of the Maddison’s hour data, sought to construct a series of real
wages for comparable periods of work time.10  Assuming that distortions in the
labor market did not affect the relation between wages and productivity, how
well Maddison’s GDP/hour series tracks Williamson’s wage series provides
some measure of the former’s reliability.11  Figure 1 traces the coefficient of
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 Maddison, Economic Growth, p. 225.
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 Maddison’s numbers are reproduced in Table 3. The observed variation in annual hours is due
to different assumptions Maddison made about the number of weeks worked per year. See
footnote 19 below.
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 Matthews, Feinstein, Odling-Smee, British Growth.
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 Williamson, "Evolution", was not completely successful in controlling for work hours. Of the
European wage observations in the Williamson data for the period between 1850 and 1914, nine
percent reflect earnings per hour, 23 percent daily earnings, 16 percent weekly earnings and 11
percent monthly or annual earnings; 40 percent of all observations are unspecified.
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 Hatton and Williamson, Age of Migration, noted some factors that explain differences in the
rates of convergence of real wages and GDP/person. The trends in the two variables should be the
same, however.
4variation of Maddison’s GDP/hour series for 12 European countries (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Williamson’s real wages
series for 12 countries (excluding Austria, Finland and Switzerland; including
Ireland, Portugal and Spain).12  Maddison’s series shows little change between
1870 and 1895, but for the entire period, 1870 to 1913, the dispersion in
productivity narrowed by about 40 percent.  Williamson found gradual
convergence in real wages until 1905 or so, after which convergence either
stopped or even reversed itself in Europe.  Indeed, Williamson appears to be
less than enthusiastic about labor market integration within Europe than
between New and Old World.  In short, the differences between the
conventional measures of productivity and real wages suggest that Maddison’s
underlying hours series needs to be improved upon before we can draw any
conclusions about growth rates and standards of living in the glory days.
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 In calculating c.v.’s  for Figure 1 we use estimates of GDP/hour as found in Maddison’s
baseline work, Economic Growth.
5Trends in hours worked in Europe, 1870-1899: some new
evidence
Data collected by the US Department of Labor, under the supervision of
Carroll Wright, provide a comparative picture of work hours in North
America and Europe for the late nineteenth century.13 The Department
consulted over 714 sources on non-agricultural work hours, mainly published
and unpublished government accounts.  The virtue of the report is that it
combines both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and, in this
regard, is more reliable than series that rely on observations on a small sample
of businesses, usually textile mills or mines, only.  The report distinguished as
well between women’s and men’s work hours.
Here we use all data gathered for European countries between 1870 and 1899.
Table 1 gives the relevant descriptive statistics.  Of the 4,902 observations
collected, about 55 percent are from the UK; 14 percent from Germany; 13
percent from France.  The survey’s breakdown by sector is roughly similar
across countries (services account for between five to eight percent and textile
and manufacturing about 45-50 percent); as a result the resulting average and
annual work hours series are left uncorrected.14  No doubt the small sample
sizes for certain countries, like Denmark, make it hazardous to ascertain
annual movements, and in constructing the annual series in Table 2 some
smoothing procedure was required.15  We opted to use a five-year moving
average, although the following results do not vary greatly under different
assumptions.
Independent estimates of work hours provide a check on the reliability of our
source and procedures.  Average hours in the UK calculated from the report
correspond to Matthews and his collaborators’ average for 1873-1913; the
trends in German and French hours we report in Table 2 are similar to those
found in other studies.16  There are differences between the estimates based on
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transport workers.
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 Because of the differing proportions of male and female workers in the sample and because
male workers hours were not everywhere greater than women’s, Table 2 is based on male workers
only.
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 Hoffmann, Das Wachstum; Marchand and Thélot, Deux siècles; Villa, Analyse
macroéconomique.
6the report and data available for Denmark, Belgium and Italy, but these latter
series rely heavily on observations for single business enterprises.17
Tables 1 and Tables 2 do not sit well with Maddison’s assertions about work
hours.  The level of and changes in British hours were distinctly different from
that found in Europe.  The work week was 20 percent shorter in the UK than
in Belgium in 1870, a country whose GDP/person was second to the UK’s.18
These findings hold across all sectors.  Within Europe there was also great
variability.  Germany saw the greatest decline in work hours; some countries
like France showed no significant change; still others like Italy experienced
first a rise and then a decline in work hours.
Some comment ought to be made about the long work hours and the increase
or stability in hours in several countries given the rise in levels of income.
Table 3 presents annual work hours (per worker and per person) for 1870 and
1899 based on our sample and estimates for 1870 and 1913 from Maddison.
The figures of annual work hours for our first two benchmarks (H&L) are
calculated on the assumption that the numbers of weeks worked for each
country in the period was constant.19  The new estimates reveal extremely long
work hours in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland in 1870, and in Spain in
1899, but these totals correspond to the figure of 3,366 to 3,538 work hours
calculated by Voth for London in 1800.20  Why would employers in newly
developing countries stick with such long work hours?  One strand in the
literature suggests that employers were not aware of the impact on health of
very long hours; others have observed that employers actually believed along
with Nassau Senior that profits are earned in the last hour of work.21
                                                
17
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 As a comparison, Rosenbloom, "One Market," found only a two to three percent difference in
work hours in midwestern and eastern cities in the US in the 1890s.
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 The estimates are averages from Maddison, Economic Growth, who assumed in his
calculations of annual hours that the number of weeks worked per year declined in the period.
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the period before 1913, workers, unions and social reformers focused their demands on the
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Netherlands 47.73; Spain 46.50; Switzerland 48.06.
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 Voth, "Time and Work." Atack and Bateman, "How Long was the Workday," reported a
similar result for the US in 1880.
21
 Atack and Bateman, "Effect of Long Hours."
7The data series suggest an alternative explanation based on the observation
that the trend in work hours for most countries had an inverse U shape.22  In
the UK work hours and the work week were shorter before industrialization
than during the first generation of factory work.  For the textile sector, M.A.
Bienefeld set the working week at 69 hours at the turn of the nineteenth
century, rising to 72 by 1830, before beginning the long and gradual descent
to 54 hours by 1914.23  The reasons for the initial increase in the UK as
elsewhere are complex.  Rising capital labor ratios provided employers with
an incentive to work longer hours.  As well, the lack of a long-term
commitment between employer and employees may have led firms to set the
length of the working day at a higher level than was consistent with the long-
run health and productivity of workers.  As worker attachment to their rural
roots loosened and as employers faced increased costs from high labor
turnover, the two parties could begin thinking about long-term interests and
began reducing the length of the working day in a way consistent with these
interests.  As for the rate in decline in hours, this varied across countries
depending upon the relative strength of unions, social reformers and
employers’ associations.  We will return to this issue in a later section.
The inverse U shaped pattern implies that countries do catch-up or, better,
level-off and this explains the evidence of convergence found in Table 3.
Among our sample of countries, the coefficient of variation of hours per
worker and per person narrowed from 1870 to 1899.  Still, the spread
(maximum-minimum) in work hours in the 1870s (Belgium - UK) and 1899
(Spain - UK) actually widened.
As reported, the divergence in work hours between countries is an
underestimate of workers’ welfare because it does not include gains to workers
owing to increased leisure time.  Fewer hours worked by the employed implies
greater leisure, which presumably adds to workers’ utility.  This is not true for
the unemployed or for those working fewer hours than they would like to.
Still, standard neo-classical analysis suggests that adults in countries with
fewer hours worked will be better off relative to those in countries with more
hours worked at the same level of GDP/person.  This implies that units like the
UK were better off than income estimates that do not control for different
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8work hours have suggested.  Moreover, as UK work hours fell relatively,
leisure-augmented GDP would have diverged across Europe.
We pursue this logic and reevaluate GDP/person to take into account
differences in hours worked across countries.  Following Beckerman, the
adjustment is based on changes in work hours from the base period (1870) to
1899.24  For Belgium Table 3 reports GDP/person of $3579 in 1899 and a
decrease of 94.92 work hours per person between 1870 and 1899.   Assume,
following Crafts, that labor’s share of income was 70 percent; the gain in
leisure is 0.7 x 2.72 per hour (the average GDP/hour worked in 1899) x 94.92
= $180.  Thus the leisure-augmented GDP/person is = $3759 (last column
Table 3).
The differences between GDP/person and GDP/leisure make clear the
importance of work hours in measuring worker welfare.  For Switzerland in
1899, leisure-augmented GDP is 10.8 percent higher than GDP/person; for
France, GDP is actually higher by 4.2%; while for Belgium the two measures
are about the same.  As a result, country rankings vary with the welfare
measure chosen.  The dispersion of workers’ experiences also widens.  All
measures of dispersion (bottom panel Table 3) for GDP/leisure are greater
than those for GDP/person.25
Labor market regulation and social insurance
The number of hours spent at work and the wages received in exchange for
this time are two important determinants of worker welfare.  A third is the
conditions workers face while at work and the income they can expect when
unable to sell their labor time due to unemployment, illness or old age.
Between 1850 and 1913, work and time spent out of work came to be
regulated by labor market legislation such as Factory Acts, and by the
enactment of social insurance entitlements against unemployment, illness and
old age.26  There are no direct measures that would permit comparisons of
working conditions and social insurance payments across time and between
countries prior to 1913.  Instead, in this section we aim to construct a Labor
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 The calculations in this paragraph are based on Beckerman, "Comparative Growth"; and
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constant (that is, no technical or organizational change).
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 Bell and Freeman, "Amercians and Germans," found similar results using different techniques
for the period after 1945.
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 For an extended discussion of this transition and the role of social protection, see Rimlinger,
Welfare Policy.
9Market Regulation Index using data collected from government documents
and contemporary surveys that recorded the spread of regulations and social
insurance entitlements.  We use this index as a proxy for the actual conditions
of work and social insurance payments.27  While it is reasonable to assume
that working conditions were better in countries with well-developed labor
market regulations and that social insurance payments were higher were
entitlements were defined, some caution is needed.  Contemporary British
policy makers often observed that while on paper continental nations tended to
regulate the labor of children and women more closely, enforcement of
regulations was in practice more thorough in the UK than on the Continent.
No attempt will be made to correct for this type of error, although it warrants
further research.
Our  Labor Market Regulation Index for 17 European countries between 1830
and 1913 exploits the same methodology underlying the United Nation’s
Human Development Index (HDI).28  The Index itself is a composite of 11
equally weighted labor market regulations and social insurance entitlements.
For each component minimums and maximums were defined with the
minimum representing the state of labor markets around 1830 and the
maximum conditions in 1913:
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 Sources consulted: Factory acts, hours of labor for young workers and women, age of
admission to factory work, age at which night work permitted, night work for women - Brooke,
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 Crafts, "Dimensions," offers a description.
10
MINIMUMS MAXIMUMS
Labor market regulations
(For discrete regulations, 1 signifies
regulation in place; 0 not in place)
1) Minimum age children allowed 8 14
to work in manufacturing establishments
2) Maximum length of working day 14 6
of young workers
3) Age at which night work allowed 8 18
4) Women excluded from night work 0 1
5) Length of working day for women 14 10
6) Factory Act adopted 0 1
7) Factory inspection in place 0 1
Social insurance settlements
1) Workers Compensation Insurance 0 1
2) Unemployment Insurance 0 1
3) Sickness Insurance 0 1
4) Old Age Insurance 0 1
We then calculated an index measuring in percentage terms the progress each
country had made between the minimum and the maximum.  To illustrate, in
1837 the Swiss established 16 as the minimum age for children to work at
night.  Using the minimum and maximum values we established, the Swiss
earned a score of (16-8)/(18-8) = 0.8 for this component in 1840.  The Labor
Market Regulation Index is the average (equally weighted) of the 11
components and measures the overall progress each country had made in
introducing different regulations and social insurance entitlements.   
The choice of minimum and maximum standards merits some elaboration.
The minimums represent working conditions and entitlements around 1830
before the enactment of state policy, while the maximums reflect conditions
found in 1913 under the most progressive legislation or alternatively those set
by the 1890 Berlin Conference on Labour in Factories and Mines.29
Admittedly the choice of endpoints is arbitrary (thus an argument could be
made that the minimum age of child workers was actually below eight years).
Having said that, this approach meets our objective in establishing the distance
countries had traveled from an unregulated to regulated world.  For all of the
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social insurance entitlements, and a number of the labor market regulations,
minimums took the value of zero in the absence of state policy; maximums
were assigned the value of one where policy had been enacted.  No attempt
was made to give precise monetary values to any of the social insurance
entitlements.  Where states introduced partial and/or voluntary plans for sick,
unemployment and pension benefits, and worker compensation as a precursor
to more comprehensive entitlements, a value of 0.5 was assigned.30
The indices found in Table 4 show that for the period 1830 to 1913 countries
moved to regulate labor markets and to define social insurance entitlements at
different times and to different degrees.  In 1830 only two countries,
Switzerland and Austria, had any type of regulation in place.  By 1850 they
were joined by France, Germany, Hungary and the UK.  Thereafter, the UK
took the leadership; it had a factory inspectorate, and laws that restricted child
labor and established a maximum 11 hour work day for women.  The period
from 1850 to 1870 saw little change in terms of the number of countries
regulating their labor markets and the extent of regulation in each country.
The next wave of regulation was initiated by the Swiss during the 1870s; by
1880 it was second only to the UK in its willingness to regulate labor.  The
mantle of change quickly passed to Germany which introduced in the 1880s
and 1890s new laws to regulate labor and new types of social insurance
entitlements.  Germany increased employers’ liabilities for accident victims in
1871, introduced a sickness insurance scheme in 1883, created a state
administered workers compensation scheme in 1884, and introduced old age
pensions in 1889.  By 1890, Germany had the distinction of having the most
comprehensive list of labor market regulations and social insurance
entitlements.  The UK did not match these improvements and by 1899 ranked
only fourth, after having led other European countries in the introduction of
regulations for much of the century.
The index illustrates the role of politics in shaping labor market institutions.31
Consider the British and German models.  Inspired by liberalism, the UK was
anxious to provide a framework for stable labor markets, but was reluctant to
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 According to Léon-Eli Troclet, "Législation sociale," nineteenth century European states fell
into one of three distinct categories: The first comprised countries where liberalism had taken
hold, such as Britain and to some degree France; the second group was composed of
authoritarian regimes, Germany and Switzerland, with some elected representation; the third
group consisted of countries like Spain and Italy with little or no representation.
12
restrict the right of individuals to enter into contracts.  At an early date,
individuals were given new rights to protect themselves through collective
bargaining; those deemed unable to defend their self-interest, including
women and children, were offered special protections.32  But the adult male
worker was expected to fend for himself and to make his own provision for
unemployment, old age and accident insurance.  The UK moved earlier than
almost any other European nation to regulate the employment of women and
children.  Still, during the 1870s and 1880s British officials quickly rejected
the Swiss proposal to limit the working day of workers across Europe.
Indeed, facing growing foreign competition, coalitions of male (skilled and
semi-skilled) workers and employers advocated loosening employment
regulations.  In the textile industry, for example, male spinners and employers
lobbied to prevent age restrictions for young workers.33  The UK was also
slow to adopt the advances in social insurance pioneered elsewhere in part
because they viewed this as an infringement of the rights of adult males to
contract.  As long as the British working class accepted these compromises,
British policy makers resisted following the leads of Continental nations after
1870.  That said, the spread of collective bargaining and of Labor politics
towards the end of the century, and the resulting changes in the nature of class
relations, forced the state to find means to protect both skilled and unskilled.
In 1897 the replacement of accident compensation by a compulsory insurance
scheme marked the first meaningful regulation that infringed on the rights of
male adults to make their own deals with their employers.  Benefits for the old
were accorded in 1908 with the provision of state pensions for the general
population; the unemployed were offered relief in 1911.
In Germany the battle between democracy and the absolutist monarchy had yet
to be resolved by 1913 and the state pursued its role as regulator.34  The nature
of German protective legislation was shaped by the challenges of the
conservative land-owning class who opposed the spread of modern industrial
society, and the demands of the most powerful socialist party in Europe which
sought state protection from the evils associated with industrial society.  In
order to consolidate the power of the state, Bismarck used labor market
regulations and social insurance as a means to undermine the right and the left.
As a result, the evolution of labor market regulations and social insurance
entitlements in Germany was almost the mirror image of that found in the UK.
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13
Bismarck focused on social insurance schemes because they were seen as the
most effective way to build and maintain the loyalty of the working class to
the monarchy.  Health insurance was introduced in 1883, accident insurance in
1884 and old age pensions in 1889; these measures were in place before
similar programs were available in the UK.  Factory legislation to regulate
labor markets and the promotion of trade unions to facilitate working class
self-help played less of a role in Germany.  Bismarck believed that these
changes would hamper the competitive position of German industry and, if
applied only to women, would harm their opportunities in the labor market.
The German state would only move towards labor market regulations in the
last decade of the century as labor strife and socialist agitation continued to
challenge the existing government.  In 1890 Wilhelm II, prompted by a major
strike in the coal mining regions the previous year, announced the "new
course" which included comprehensive labor market regulations on the British
model, a half century after they became the norm in the UK.
In many respects the UK and Germany had converged by WWI, both adopting
a wide range of labor market regulations and social insurance.  But for most of
the century they were on very different paths and the timing and their
commitment to these policies reflected differences in political forces as much
as common economic factors.  For all of Europe, our measures of convergence
(bottom panel of Table 4) suggest that some uniformity in regulatory
environment is observed only at the end of the period.  Between 1830 and
1900 the gap between the most and least regulated nation grew and the
interquartile spread increased as well.  The coefficient of variation only began
falling towards the end of the century.
A worker development index
In the preceding sections we developed new measures of work hours and labor
market regulation. We now combine this information, along with Williamson’s
real wage series (UK = 100 in 1905), into a composite index.  Using the same
methodology as above, we define minimums and maximums for the three
components:
MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Wages 26 110
Hours of work 3500 2500
Labor Regulation 0 1
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The resulting series (the first three columns of Table 5), in which real wages
carry a weight of 50 percent, work hours 25 percent and labor regulation 25
percent, gives us a single, comprehensive measure of the quality of life of
European workers from 1870 to 1913.35
We cannot be certain there was convergence in workers’ welfare across
Europe in the period.  With mobile capital, technology and workers – about 50
percent of European migrants in the period actually staid in Europe – one
would have expected some equalization of the returns to labor across the
continent.36  Consider the case of Italian workers who moved to France
because of attractive wages.  As a result, either wages or benefits would have
increased in Italy, and/or work hours declined.  There is evidence in Table 5
that adjustments of this sort were taking place at all margins.  In 1899 a
Belgian worker could expect to receive comparatively high wages, but long
work hours and little in the way of labor regulation.  A Danish worker could
expect to receive slightly lower wages than the Belgians, but work shorter
hours in a slightly better labor market environment.  A German worker would
receive as well lower wages than his Belgian neighbor, but work about 200
hours less each year in the most highly regulated environment.  Despite these
trade-offs, based on the measures of dispersion reported in Table 5, it is not
evident that a level playing field in labor costs was obtained by 1913.
Although the coefficient of variation of the WDI declines over the period, the
gap between the best and least well-off workers increased, and the spread
actually widens considerably from 1870 to 1899.  Spain's WDI actually fell
between 1870 and 1899 and by 1913 it was barely higher than it had been in
1870.  Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland enjoyed substantial increases,
while gains in France and the Netherlands were more modest.
Contemporary attitudes toward a legislated level playing field mesh with the
finding that compensating adjustments of wages, hours and entitlements did
not necessarily lead to equal returns to labor.37  The movement for a
standardized regulatory environment was first led by Switzerland, a small
open economy whose employers beginning in the 1870s showed concern that
demands for increased benefits and regulation would reduce its
competitiveness.  Yet it was not until 1890 when the leading European nations
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 We have experimented with other weights, but the results did not differ greatly. Note that for
1870 and 1899 we employ our new estimates of hours per worker per week. Our data do not
extend to 1913 and we assume that the hours worked in 1913 were the same as hours in 1899.
36
 On internal migration in Europe, see Rosoli, "Italian Migration."
37
 Ehrenberg, Labor Markets, found a similar result for contemporary Europe.
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met in Berlin to craft a set of labor standards.38  The Germans because of their
tradition of state regulation and their plan to modify their own labor code were
sympathetic to the Swiss position enunciated two decades earlier.  But other
economies desired to protect their distinct cost advantages.  The UK sent
delegates to Berlin reluctantly and with clear instructions not to accept
projects that went beyond the limits established by existing British legislation;
the French supported British positions, albeit in some cases only reluctantly.
Belgium, along with Portugal and the Netherlands, opposed much of what was
proposed.  It is not surprising that the effort in Berlin failed.39  Not only was
there disagreement between rich and poor countries but among the developed
countries themselves - a conflict that represented the different combinations of
wages, work hours, work conditions and entitlements European workers could
expect to receive.
The dispersion of WDI across countries is but part of the story.  Within
countries there were wide differences in workers’ welfare.  First, there were
differences in women’s experiences.  In six of nine countries, women tended to
work longer hours then men.  Second, owing to global trade forces, workers’
welfare varied by sector.  For Germany, the UK and Italy, Table 6 gives
average work hours in 1870 and 1899 in three sectors: mining and
construction which can be taken to represent the non-tradable sector; textiles
(mainly cotton and woolen), representing tradable goods produced by semi-
skilled workers; and iron and steel (including engineering) which can be
identified with the output of skilled workers.  Whereas the decline in work
hours in the non-tradable sector in Germany and UK was in line with the
overall reduction in work hours in the two countries, in the semi-skilled sector
firms were more reluctant to reduce hours by the same proportion  because of
stiffer international competition.  Italian textile firms actually increased their
work hours over the period.  In skilled trades, where the UK and Germany had
a distinct advantage, average hours declined to a greater extent than in the
tradable semi-skilled sector.40
Globalization was not the only factor that impacted on workers’ welfare.
There are also political and social factors to consider.  The northern European
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 This paragraph is based on Follows, International Labour Organization; and Delevigne,
"History of Labor Legislation."
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 Nonetheless, Berlin was the first step towards the birth of the International Association for
Labour Legislation in 1901, the forerunner of the post WWI International Labour Organization.
See Shotwell, Origins; and Johnston, ILO.
40
 These findings are consistent with the view held by Wood, "How Trade Hurt," for the period
after 1945.
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countries were more egalitarian than many of their neighbors.41 Returning to
Table 1, the spread (maximum - minimum) between low and high work-hour
sectors, was 2.7 hours in Denmark and 5.32 in the Netherlands; in contrast it
was 7.81 hours in France; and 9.0 in the UK, about the same as could be found
in Spain.
The Danish case, because it highlights the potentially countervailing or
reinforcing roles of macroeconomic policy and social and economic factors in
determining workers’ standard of living, merits further consideration.  In terms
of WDI, it moved from seventh place in 1870 to third in 1899 and 1913.
Denmark remained committed to free-trade in wheat and this is revealed in the
change in factor prices; real wages nearly tripled between 1870 and 1900.  But
at the same time, owing to its unique political makeup, the country was among
the first to introduce factory inspection and sickness insurance.42  Like
Germany, its government was not responsible to the national assembly.
However, it had a strong trade union movement and it was the first country to
develop a bipartite national institutional structure of industrial relations.
For the entire sample, Table 7 examines the correlation in 1899 between
macroeconomic variables (open market forces, government finances and
political and union structure), and measures of welfare (WDI, HDI and
GDP/person.)43  TARIFF is the rate of protection of wheat imports; GOVT is
expenditures on health, unemployment insurance and housing and is a measure
of resource redistribution; VOTE is the percentage of the male population
eligible to vote; and UNION refers to the percentage of union members in the
labor force.
WDI is more closely related to GDP/person than HDI which makes sense
given the weight of economic factors, wages and work hours, in WDI.  The
determinants of WDI and GDP/person vary, however.  While GDP is
negatively related to tariffs as expected, the relation between openness and
WDI is very weak.  WDI is highly correlated with union membership and, to a
lesser extent, government expenditures.  Neither UNION nor VOTE nor
GOVT is strongly correlated with GDP/person.  Thus, while GDP increased in
the glory days, workers everywhere were not necessarily better off because of
open market polices.  There were internal questions concerning the
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 Crouch, Industrial Relations, pp. 95-124.
43
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from Maddison, Monitoring; HDI from Crafts, "Human Development," pp. 310-11; TARIFF is
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distribution of these gains.  Workers depended on the support of unions or a
central authority to get their share.
We estimated a number of basic regressions (OLS) to confirm these
tendencies (t-statistics in parentheses).  Because of the small number of
observations, we limited the regressions to two independent variables.
(1) WDI = 0.434 - 0.002TARIFF + 0.032UNION
(-1.239) (4.011)
R2 = 0.82 F = 13.48 (p = 0.01).
A five percent increase in union membership would have added about 0.150
units to a country’s WDI, enough for France to have jumped from being sixth
to third in the rankings in 1899.  The impact of the tariff is negligible, if non
existent.
(2) WDI =  0.485 - 0.002TARIFF + 0.242GOVT
(-0.840) (1.813)
R2 = 0.7 F = 3.92 (p = 0.08).
Although regression (2) performs less well than (1), a small change in
government social spending contributes quite a lot to a country's WDI ranking.
A one percent increase in the Netherlands would have moved it from seventh
to second place in WDI rankings in 1899.
(3) GDP/person = 3509 - 30.35TARIFF + 238.39GOVT
(-2.222) (0.386)
 R2 = 0.58 F = 4.19 (p = 0.07).
This result is consistent with Williamson's claims that those economies which
remained open tended to grow faster and converge to the leader.
Governments did not contribute much to growth.44
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 With HDI as the dependent variable, only VOTE is significant:
HDI = 0.420 + 0.003VOTE
            (2.212)
R2 = 0.41  F = 4.89 (p = 0.06).
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We draw the following conclusions, albeit tentative given our sample size and
the restricted time period examined, about the dispersion of WDI between
countries and the determinants of WDI.  The evidence is mixed whether or not
WDI converged over the period.  The weak trend toward convergence, or lack
of, was the result of differences in political and institutional arrangements - the
legacy of history - among countries.  Workers seem to have done better where
unions put pressure on governments to redistribute income.  Workers’ welfare
was not necessarily related to open market polices.  Indeed, as customs
earnings were an important source of government receipts in the period, the
tariff can be interpreted as a key policy tool in making workers better off.
Conclusion: Labor markets during the glory days
This paper has sought to widen our understanding about the standard of living
in late nineteenth century Europe.  Combining information about wages, work
hours, work conditions, labor market regulations and social entitlements, the
WDI reveals a weak trend in the convergence of worker welfare across
nations.  While increased economic trade in the period may have created
competitive tensions between nations and stimulated factor price effects within
nations, these forces did not lead automatically to an integrated international
labor market.  Owing to different labor market histories and national social
and political pressures, countries had developed different means to distribute
the dividends of increased trade.  As a result, countries had different work
hours; national authorities differed as well in their health and safety records;
still others had different child labor laws and regulations concerning pensions
and unemployment.  The failed attempt at Berlin in 1890 to harmonize labor
legislation revealed the extent of divergence in these areas in late nineteenth
century Europe.  Indeed, the fact that Berlin happened at the end of the period,
not the beginning, suggests that if anything the gap between nations had grown
over the century rather than converged.
The research and conclusions reported here suggest some further avenues of
investigation.  First, we need to extend our knowledge of work hours both for
the period before 1870 and after 1900.  Second, we need to be wary of
GDP/hour estimates that assume that work hours were constant across
countries in the nineteenth century.  Third, to more fully evaluate how well
economic agents were really doing, we need to situate measures of welfare,
such as GDP/person and the HDI, in their appropriate legal and social context.
Finally, and more generally, convergence studies must look beyond factor
price ratios, and trends in income and productivity.  We need to consider as
19
well the institutional environment.  We need to better understand why
globalization does not lead inevitably to convergence in labor institutions and
work arrangements for nineteenth century Europe – as well as the
contemporary world.45
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 On the integration of labor market institutions in the contemporary period, see Jacoby, ed.,
Workers of Nations.
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Table 1: Average hours of work per week, 1870-1899
(number of observation) [percentages]
Hours of work per week
All Men Women
Mining and
Construction
Iron and Steel Textile Manufacturing Service
Belgium 67.64 (171) 67.31 (149) 69.09 (22) 65.73 (41) 68.07 (43) 70.54 (54) 63.04 (23) 68.60 (10)
[87.1] [12.9] [24.0] [25.1] [31.6] [13.4] [5.8]
Denmark 62.22 (45) 61.88 (43) 69.50 (2) 61.55 (11) 61.78 (9) 63.33 (3) 62.22 (18) 64.25 (4)
[95.5] [4.4] [24.4] [20.0] [6.6] [40.0] [8.9]
France 65.14 (638) 65.02 (535) 65.77 (103) 62.83 (149) 65.01 (139) 66.73 (196) 63.00 (104) 70.64 (50)
[83.9] [16.1] [23.3] [21.8] [30.7] [16.3] [7.8]
Germany 65.27 (664) 65.28 (608) 65.20 (56) 62.11 (140) 65.06 (152) 66.33 (139) 66.28 (179) 68.07 (54)
[91.6] [8.4] [21.1] [22.9] [20.9] [26.9] [8.1]
Italy 64.27 (270) 63.91 (232) 66.45 (38) 62.20 (44) 62.89 (76) 66.61 (83) 63.88 (42) 64.92 (25)
[85.9] [14.0] [16.2] [28.1] [30.7] [15.5] [9.3]
Netherlands 65.31 (178) 65.35 (173) 64.00 (5) 64.22 (47) 66.94 (47) 64.60 (30) 64.21 (41) 69.53 (13)
[97.2] [2.8] [26.4] [26.4] [16.9] [23.0] [7.3]
Spain 64.76 (76) 64.87 (70) 63.50 (6) 61.31 (16) 64.76 (21) 63.82 (17) 63.93 (15) 70.71 (7)
[92.1] [7.9] [21.0] [27.6] [22.4] [19.7] [9.2]
Switzerland 65.07 (140) 64.34 (122) 70.06 (18) 62.00 (38) 63.58 (24) 69.07 (42) 64.70 (33) 64.33 (3)
[87.1] [12.9] [27.1] [17.1] [30.0] [23.6] [2.1]
United 55.27 (2720) 55.13 (2491) 56.76 (229) 53.27 (1004) 56.70 (662) 56.33 (528) 54.80 (428) 62.31 (98)
Kingdom [91.6] [8.4] [36.9] [24.3] [19.4] [15.7] [3.6]
59.69 (4902) 59.47 (4423) 61.73 (479) 56.38 (1490) 60.32 (1173) 61.81 (1092) 59.85 (883) 66.18 (264)
[90.2] [9.8] [30.4] [24.0] [22.3] [18.1] [5.1]
Source: See text.
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Table 2: Hours of work per week, 1870-1899, Men (five year moving averages)
YEAR Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland Un. Kingdom
1870 70.46 60.18 66.30 69.84 64.60 60.40 62.93 69.60 58.41
1871 69.26 60.18 65.53 68.98 62.76 61.92 62.92 69.60 58.42
1872 68.06 60.18 64.43 68.09 63.16 63.13 62.91 69.30 58.22
1873 68.06 60.49 63.33 66.72 63.16 63.17 62.90 69.65 57.77
1874 68.06 60.81 63.33 66.24 63.31 63.21 62.89 68.65 56.92
1875 68.06 61.12 61.53 65.97 63.46 63.25 62.88 68.35 55.98
1876 68.06 61.44 60.23 65.38 63.06 63.29 62.85 68.05 54.88
1877 68.06 61.76 60.00 64.79 62.70 63.33 62.86 67.75 54.28
1878 68.06 62.07 60.00 63.44 63.65 63.37 62.84 67.45 53.95
1879 68.06 61.95 60.00 62.83 62.45 63.41 62.47 66.99 54.16
1880 68.06 61.84 60.00 63.84 62.75 63.45 62.84 66.52 54.50
1881 68.80 61.72 60.96 63.71 63.55 63.49 63.01 66.05 54.60
1882 69.54 61.60 61.92 63.58 64.10 63.53 63.18 65.58 54.74
1883 68.34 61.48 62.35 64.89 63.22 63.40 63.35 65.20 54.61
1884 69.75 61.37 62.78 65.60 63.98 64.47 63.86 64.81 54.77
1885 69.29 61.34 64.89 67.12 65.84 64.41 64.00 64.61 55.31
1886 69.00 61.37 65.49 67.42 64.84 64.34 64.13 64.91 55.72
1887 67.86 61.37 66.09 66.10 64.09 64.19 65.33 65.21 55.68
1888 67.86 61.37 66.69 65.29 65.43 64.24 66.53 63.73 56.05
1889 68.24 61.37 68.39 66.80 64.98 64.33 67.93 62.57 56.27
1890 67.90 61.37 67.89 66.28 62.76 66.18 68.23 61.80 55.81
1891 66.58 61.37 67.39 65.08 63.16 65.95 68.52 60.94 55.45
1892 67.12 61.37 68.11 63.88 64.23 65.73 68.82 61.02 55.63
1893 67.12 61.58 66.90 63.83 63.14 65.89 68.82 61.02 55.19
1894 66.53 61.88 65.37 63.79 62.81 66.06 68.82 60.42 54.38
1895 66.13 62.02 64.35 63.44 62.35 66.06 68.82 60.42 53.59
1896 66.53 62.24 64.83 63.08 61.89 66.06 68.82 60.28 53.24
1897 65.40 62.46 64.00 60.14 61.44 66.06 68.82 59.60 52.79
1898 63.10 62.70 63.78 58.65 60.98 66.06 68.82 59.60 52.38
1899 62.70 62.70 63.78 58.89 60.98 66.06 68.82 59.60 52.17
Source: See text.
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Table 3: Hours worked per worker and per person
(ranking)
Hours per worker Hours per person GDP/person ($ 1990 int)
1870
Maddison
1870
H&L
1899
H&L
1913
Maddison
1870
Maddison
1870
H&L
1899
H&L
1913
Maddison
1899
Maddison
1899 Leisure
augmented
Belgium 2964 3363 2993 2605 1245.3 1412.9 1318.0 1147.3 3579 (3) 3759 (3)
Denmark 2945 2854 2973 2553 1279.1 1239.5 1272.9 1092.9 2840 (7) 2788 (6)
France 2945 3144 3024 2588 1363.7 1455.8 1550.3 1209.2 2884 (6) 2760 (7)
Germany 2941 3318 2798 2584 1213.3 1368.9 1204.8 1112.7 3045 (5) 3339 (5)
Italy 2886 3004 2835 2536 1425.0 1483.2 1343.4 1201.3 1663 (9) 1784 (9)
Netherlands 2964 2882 3153 2605 1133.1 1102.1 1191.9 984.1 3703 (2) 3508 (4)
Spain 2926 3200 1433.8 1504.1 2040 (8) 1973 (8)
Switzerland 2984 3359 2864 2624 1439.2 1641.7 1421.7 1293.0 3463 (4) 3838 (2)
Un. Kingdom 2984 2797 2498 2624 1250.6 1172.3 1088.3 1143.0 4670 (1) 4922 (1)
Max-mina 98 566 702 88 306.2 539.6 462.0 308.9 3007 3138
St. dev. 31.42 228.5 210.4 31.8 106.9 168.7 151.4 91.6 901.05 979.11
Coef. var 1.02 7.44 7.19 1.2 8.3 12.3 11.4 7.9 29.07 30.73
Interquartileb 15.5 226.6 115.3 23 82.5 117.5 120.3 94.3 600.5 607.5
Notes: a The difference between the maximum and minimum values
b
 Interquantile spread is equal to the value of the (75th percentile - 25th percentile) / 2
Sources: Maddison, Monitoring; Crafts, "Dimensions".
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Table 4: Labor market regulation index (ranking)
1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1899 1913
Austria 0.091 (1) 0.091 (5) 0.202 (3) 0.217 (3) 0.217 (3) 0.217 (6) 0.561 (2) 0.72 (2) 0.811 (4)
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.338 (6) 0.383 (10) 0.731 (7)
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.624 (12)
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0.235 (5) 0.235 (10) 0.553 (6) 0.667 (10)
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.242 (9) 0.333 (11) 0.447 (17)
France 0 0 0.159 (4) 0.159 (4) 0.159 (4) 0.311 (4) 0.311 (3) 0.674 (3) 0.833 (2)
Germany 0 0.224 (2) 0.224 (2) 0.361 (2) 0.361 (2) 0.406 (3) 0.633 (1) 0.808 (1) 0.83 (3)
Hungary 0 0.152 (3) 0.152 (5) 0.121 (5) 0.121 (5) 0.121 (8) 0.194 (11) 0.33 (12) 0.603 (13)
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.188 (12) 0.324 (13) 0.658 (11)
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0.091 (9) 0.417 (5) 0.463 (5) 0.739 (6)
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.47 (7) 0.712 (9)
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.294 (15) 0.476 (16)
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.182 (13) 0.311 (14) 0.54 (14)
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0.155 (7) 0.155 (14) 0.155 (16) 0.483 (15)
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.288 (8) 0.288 (9) 0.758 (5)
Switzerland 0.018 (2) 0.133 (4) 0.133 (6) 0.144 (6) 0.114 (6) 0.443 (2) 0.443 (4) 0.443 (5) 0.716 (8)
Un. Kingdom 0 0.311 (1) 0.483 (1) 0.483 (1) 0.483 (1) 0.559 (1) 0.559 (3) 0.559 (4) 0.907 (1)
Max-min 0.091 0.311 0.483 0.483 0.483 0.559 0.633 0.808 0.46
St. dev. 0.022 0.096 0.133 0.146 0.146 0.183 0.195 0.210 0.135
Mean 0.006 0.053 0.080 0.086 0.086 0.149 0.279 0.441 0.678
Coef. var 366.7 178.9 167.0 170.1 170.1 123.1 69.99 47.67 19.94
Interquartile 0 0.046 0.076 0.061 0.061 0.118 0.118 0.151 0.078
Sources: See text.
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Table 5: Worker development index (ranking)
Worker development index Real wages Annual hours
of work
Labor market
regulation index
1870 1899 1913 1870 1899 1913 1870 1899 1870 1899 1913
Belgium 0.237 (6) 0.609 (4) 0.714 (5) 60 91 94 3363 2993 0 0.383 0.731
Denmark 0.221 (7) 0.627 (3) 0.751 (3) 36 86 102 2854 2973 0 0.553 0.667
France 0.271 (5) 0.537 (6) 0.565 (6) 50 68 66 3144 3024 0.159 0.674 0.833
Germany 0.326 (2) 0.729 (2) 0.776 (2) 58 85 92 3318 2798 0.361 0.808 0.830
Italy 0.124 (9) 0.331 (8) 0.503 (8) 26 40 55 3004 2835 0 0.324 0.658
Netherlands 0.309 (3) 0.524 (7) 0.545 (7) 52 80 72 2882 3153 0 0.463 0.739
Spain 0.292 (4) 0.262 (9) 0.344 (9) 51 51 51 2926 3200 0 0.155 0.483
Switzerland 0.189 (8) 0.607 (5) 0.725 (4) 47 75 91 3359 2864 0.114 0.625 0.716
Un. Kingdom 0.552 (1) 0.885 (1) 0.977 (1) 69 106 110 2797 2498 0.483 0.634 0.907
Max-min 0.428 0.623 0.633 43 66 59 566 702 0.483 0.478 0.425
St. dev. 0.120 0.189 0.186 12.8 20.3 21.1 228.57 210.53 0.181 0.202 0.124
Mean 0.280 0.568 0.656 49.9 75.8 81.4 3071.9 2926.44 0.124 0.513 0.729
Coef. var 42.86 33.27 28.53 25.45 26.78 25.92 7.44 7.19 146.1 39.27 16.96
Interquartile 0.65 0.93 0.86 7.13 11.75 16.37 218 94.5 0.080 0.126 0.082
Notes: WDI is composed of real wages (50%), hours (25%) and regulation (25%). WDI in 1913 is based on 1899 work hours.
Swiss wages are inferred from GDP/person (Maddison) and UK real wages (1905=100).
Sources: Wages from Williamson, "Evolution"; work hours from Table 3; regulation index from Table 4.
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Table 6: Hours of work by sector for selected countries
Hours of work per week
Germany Italy United Kingdom
Mining and
construction
Iron and
steel
Textile Mining and
construction
Iron and
steel
Textile Mining and
construction
Iron and
steel
Textile
1870 69.04 68.16 69.22a 65.16 64.0 64.55 57.05b 59.75 59.45
1899 58.25 61.97 63.40 61.04c 61.8 66.77 51.58 53.47 54.60c
1870-1899
% change -15.6% -9.1% -8.4% -6.3% -3.4% 3.4% -9.6% -10.5% -8.1%
a
 1871 b 1872 c 1895
Source: See text.
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Table 7: Rank correlations
(’p’ values)
GDP/person HDI WDI TARIFF GOVT UNION VOTE
GDP/person 1.00
HDI 0.73 1.00
(0.026)
WDI 0.84 0.79 1.00
(0.004) (0.011)
TARIFF -0.76 -0.57 -0.57 1.00
(0.018) (0.110) (0.106)
GOVT 0.49 0.71 0.72 -0.53 1.00
(0.180) (0.034) (0.029) (0.139)
UNION 0.66 0.63 0.88 -0.43 0.65 1.00
(0.055) (0.070) (0.002) (0.246) (0.056)
VOTE 0.51 0.64 0.70 -0.485 0.61 0.35 1.00
(0.161) (0.063) (0.037) (0.184) (0.083) (0.363)
Sources: See text.
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